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Agenda
• The Big Data Problem in cyber security
• The cyber security environment for a NASA supercomputer 
center and its associated big data (referred to as a Data 
Computation Center in this presentation) 
• General cyber security objectives 
• Focus on identification of actionable security events from 
the big mountain of data that flows into and out of a Data 
Computation Center
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The Big Data Problem in Cyber Security
• Internet-accessible Data Computation Centers are under 
constant attack, which come from the Internet
• Attacks are intermixed with a large volume of legitimate 
Internet traffic flowing into and out of the Data Computation 
Center, which leads to a big mountain of data
• Cyber security tools are used to monitor for attacks, but 
these generate a big mountain of data that is added to the 
mountain of legitimate data traffic
• To keep from being overwhelmed, security analysts are 
interested in knowing about only those attacks for which 
manual or automated action is required to counter them
• The problem addressed by this presentation is how to 
extract actionable security data out of this big data 
mountain
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The NASA Big Data Supercomputer Cyber 
Security Environment
• The Data Computation Center is accessible over the 
Internet
• Legitimate users must be identified and authenticated
• Users can download their own programs and any additional 
data that is needed
• Security should not be so onerous that it impedes the use of 
the system
• Actionable security events that could lead to a misuse of the 
system should be identified and acted upon
• Need to discover actionable events from the big mountain of 
data in which they are embedded
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General Cyber Security Objectives
• Identify and authenticate legitimate users prior to granting 
them access to the Data Computation Center
• Ensure that users access only data to which they are 
authorized
• Identify attacks and block them while minimizing
- False positives – so that legitimate users are not blocked
- False negatives – so that dangerous attacks are not missed
• Ensure that malicious code and backdoors
- Are not planted in system or 
- Are detected if they are
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Two Broad Strategies for Detecting Attacks
• Direct detection approaches applied directly to the Data 
Computation Center data flowing to and from the network 
• Detection approaches applied only after reducing the big 
mountain of Data Computation Center data flowing to and 
from the network to a more manageable level
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Direct Detection Can Be Used To Detect Malicious 
Delivery Sites
• Phishing and malware delivery sites can hide behind 
constantly changing addresses
• Detection approaches are compute intensive for the big 
mountain of DNS data flowing to and from the network
• Changing IP addresses over a short time period is called 
Fast-Flux
- Detection based on counting number of IP addresses associated with 
domain and time-to-live assessment
- Important to add other parameters when making a decision as to 
whether this is malware, since content delivery networks use this for 
load balancing
• Randomly generated domain names at regular intervals in 
large numbers is called Domain Flux
- Detection based on number of domain name failures returned by the 
host making DNS request
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Direct Detection Can Be Used To Detect Malicious 
Delivery Sites
• Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) can automatically 
generate domain names
- Generated names tend to be gibberish
- Generation of names is deterministic that so that Command and 
Control site and embedded malware can communicate after change
• Use Machine Learning to Detect Domain Generation 
Algorithm Attacks
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Use Machine Learning to Detect Domain 
Generation Algorithm Attacks
• Use a combined 2-gram to 3-gram Markov chain to detect 
deviation from “normal” domain names
• While this may not detect newer DGA-generated domains 
name such as those that pair real words in a noun-verb-
noun-verb combination, it is still very useful 
• Combining with other techniques will reduce false-positives 
and false-negatives 
• Combining a 2-gram Markov chain (which is less strict on 
detecting gibberish) with an organization check and fast-flux 
domain flux detection may help detect the noun-verb-noun-
verb DGA domains.
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Detection After Reducing the Big Data 
Mountain to a More Manageable Volume
• Network flow data is the largest component of the big data 
mountain
• Want to categorize network flows into three risk categories:
- Acceptable Risk: Flows that are unlikely to contain any security 
attacks – and thus can be discarded from further analysis
- High Risk: Flows that are likely to contain security attacks – and thus 
must be extensively analyzed
- Unknown Risk: Flows for which it is unknown whether or not they 
contain a security attack – which also must be analyzed
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Categorization of Flows Based on the Source 
of the Flow
• Acceptable Risk flows:
- Flows that come from IP addresses that fall under an organization 
from which an authorized user has logged on to a Data Computation 
Center system
• High Risk risk flows:
- Flows that come from IP addresses and associated organizations 
that are on watch lists, have mounted an attack, or have scanned 
dark space
• Unknown Risk flows:
- Flows that cannot initially be placed into the acceptable or high risk 
categories 
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Detection of Malicious Command & Control 
Channels Using High Risk & Unknown Risk Flows
• Detect Command and Control activity for any malicious 
code that may have been installed in a system 
- Network beaconing activity could indicate presence of
– Botnet slave checking in for assignments
– Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) checking in for assignments or 
delivering  intellectual property
- Detection by looking for a recurring flows that provides a pattern of 
communications
- Need big data trending with flows remaining from data mountain 
reduction
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Detect Attempted or Actual Intrusions by Looking 
at High Risk and Unknown Risk Reduced Flows
• Normally a large number of Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) events for a large data center with heterogeneous 
systems
- Big data mountain reduction eliminates all but High and Unknown risk 
flows, helping to focus on events of most concern
• Still need significant computation to de-clutter the IDS 
results to identify only actionable data
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Correlation Provides a Useful Method to 
Eliminate False Positives
• Correlate IDS events with the flow that caused the IDS to 
trigger
- The flows that correlate with an IDS event are the flows on which to 
focus attention
• Correlate IDS-flows with vulnerabilities from vulnerability 
scanner 
- The flows where the IDS correlates with a vulnerability are the events 
on which to focus
• Correlation reduces false positives, but is computationally 
intensive  
• Use pattern discovery to detect distributed, targeted attacks 
that may involve recurring flows from multiple sources 
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Identify Indicators of Possible Data 
Exfiltration
• Aberrant user behavior may indicate insider threat or user-
level compromise. 
- Unusual login time for a particular user 
- New source host or organization 
- Multiple logins for same user from different locations within a small 
time window
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Identify Indicators of Possible Data 
Exfiltration
• Unusual outbound activity may indicate unauthorized data 
exfiltration
- Unauthorized access or attempting to access unauthorized hosts
- Unauthorized privilege escalation or attempting privilege escalation
- Unusual file transfer protocol
- File transfer to host or organization not seen before or to an IP 
address on a watch list
- File transfer to unauthorized foreign county
- Unusual emails such as emails with extremely large attachments and 
email bursts to free email providers
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Visualization Is Important to Cyber Security 
Since a Picture is Worth 1000 Words
• Visualization allows the security analyst to see events and 
relationships that may be lost in rows of data as well as 
summarize security event activity
• Provide visualization of the various flows that are of most 
concern to help identify patterns not before seen
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Questions?
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